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According to the Ability Hypothesis, knowing what it is like to have experience E
is just having the ability to imagine or recognize or remember having experience
E. I examine various versions of the Ability Hypothesis and point out that they all
face serious objections. Then I propose a new version that is not vulnerable to
these objections: knowing what it is like to experience E is having the ability to
discriminate imagining or having experience E from imagining or having any other
experience. I argue that if we replace the ability to imagine or recognize with the
ability to discriminate, the Ability Hypothesis can be salvaged.
I. Introduction
One big question in the philosophy of mind is the following: what is it
like to have an experience of a certain kind. A further, no less signiﬁ-
cant, question is what it means to know what it is like to have an expe-
rience of a certain kind. This question is important for at least two
reasons.
The ﬁrst reason is that it would be impossible to imagine or remem-
ber having an experience without knowing what it is like to have
that experience. I cannot imagine the taste of a Sonoma Valley Pinot
Noir if I do not know what Sonoma Valley Pinot Noir tastes like
(cf. McGinn 2000). Similarly, I cannot remember the taste of a Sonoma
Valley Pinot Noir if I do not know what Sonoma Valley Pinot Noir
tastes like (although I may still remember that I once tasted Sonoma
Valley Pinot Noir). Thus, much of our mental life is dependent on such
knowledge.
1 I am grateful to Hugh Mellor, Robert Van Gulick and Andre´ Gallois for detailed
comments on earlier versions of this paper. I am also grateful to the participants of
my seminar on imagination at Syracuse University.
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The second reason why we should be interested in the analysis of
‘knowing what it is like to have an experience’ is that this issue came
to the forefront of philosophical discussions of consciousness as an
important feature of the Knowledge Argument.
According to the Knowledge Argument, Mary is one of the world’s
leading vision scientists, an expert on color vision. As a matter of fact,
she knows all physical facts that can be known about color. However,
she has never experienced colors: she has spent her entire life in a black
and white room. When she leaves the room and looks at a red rose,
she learns something: she did not know what it is like to experience
red, but after having looked at the red rose, she does know what it is
like to experience red. But, ex hypothesi, she knew every physical fact
that is to be known about color. What could she learn then upon look-
ing at the rose? The Knowledge Argument is supposed to show that
our ﬁrst-personal experiences cannot be captured by physical facts.
There must be something irreducibly non-physical about experience.
One way to argue against this conclusion is to claim that what Mary
acquired when she looked at the rose was not propositional knowledge,
but an ability: an ability to imagine or recall or recognize certain
experiences. This is the Ability Hypothesis. As David Lewis put it,
‘‘knowing what an experience is like […] isn’t knowing-that. It’s
knowing-how’’ (Lewis 1990, p. 516). Thus, the suggestion is that to
know what it is like to have an experience of a certain kind is to have
certain abilities. Mary acquired certain abilities. She did not have these
abilities in her black and white room, she has them now. There is noth-
ing about her story that should convince us that ﬁrst-personal experi-
ences cannot be captured by physical facts.
Although the Ability Hypothesis has become a fashionable topic in
the philosophy of mind because it could be used to counter the Knowl-
edge Argument, my primary aim will be to understand what it is to know
what it is like to have an experience. The applicability of this notion on
the Knowledge Argument case is a secondary, albeit important question.
I will examine various versions of the Ability Hypothesis and point
out that they all face serious problems. Finally, I argue for a new ver-
sion of the Ability Hypothesis that is not vulnerable to these objections.
Before I do so, however, two points of clariﬁcation need to be made.
First, nothing I say here will assume that ‘knowledge how’ is a different
kind of knowledge from ‘knowledge that’. Gilbert Ryle famously argued
for such a distinction (Ryle 1949) and most versions of the Ability
Hypothesis take it for granted that ‘knowledge how’ is irreducible to
‘knowledge that’. That is why Mary can acquire the knowledge of what it
is like to experience red, which is supposed to be an instance of ‘knowledge
how’, in spite of the fact that she already possesses every possible instances
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of ‘knowledge that’ about colors. Recently, however, it has been argued
that ‘knowledge how’ is just a special case of ‘knowledge that’ (Stanley &
Williamson 2001). If this is true, then one of the main premises of the Abil-
ity Hypothesis is questioned (see Alter 2001, see also the concluding sec-
tion of the Stanley & Williamson 2001 article). Because of these worries,
in order to preserve the generality of the Ability Hypothesis, I will not take
it for granted that ‘knowledge how’ is diﬀerent from ‘knowledge that’.
I will not use the term ‘knowledge how’ at all: I use the concept of ‘ability’
instead: to know what it is like to experience red is to have certain abilities.
I do not take this way of phrasing the Ability Hypothesis interestingly dif-
ferent from the one that uses ‘knowledge how’, but in order to avoid the
possible objection along the lines of Stanley & Williamson 2001, I will use
this way of stating the Ability Hypothesis.2
Second, the Ability Hypothesis was intended as a physicalist defense
against the anti-physicalist Knowledge Argument (Lewis 1983, 1990),
but I would like to remain neutral about these implications of the
debate. Some of the proponents of the Ability Hypothesis are anti-physi-
calist (Mellor 1992 ⁄1993) and a number of those who argued against the
Ability Hypothesis are physicalist. The question about what Mary
learned (and the question about when we can say that I know what Pinot
Noir tastes like) is an important one even if we leave physicalism aside.
II. Ability Hypotheses
The Ability Hypothesis is usually treated as a monolithic category. It is
important to note, however, that different versions of it vary consider-
ably.3 We can diﬀerentiate three signiﬁcantly diﬀerent versions:
(AH1) Knowing what it is like to experience E is having the
ability to imagine having experience E.
2 This strategy may not be as unproblematic as it seems. Both Alter’s piece (Alter
2001, section 4, option 1) and the Stanley & Williamson article (Stanley & William-
son 2001, section IV) express doubts that this move would help the advocates of the
Ability Hypothesis. Stanley and Williamson argue that the ability to imagine is or
at least implies an exercise of knowledge-how. Alter argues that replacing knowing
how with abilities does not address the main objection raised against the Ability
Hypothesis. For the sake of simplicity, I put these issues about knowledge-how on
the side.
3 Diana Raﬀman makes an important distinction between two possible explananda:
knowing what it’s like to see red and knowing how red things look (Raﬀman 2005, see
also Graham & Horgan 2005, who are also endorsing this distinction). She argues
that ‘‘[h]ow red things look is learned by perceiving [whereas] what it’s like to see
(look at) red is learned by introspecting’’ (Raﬀman 2005, p. 198). I agree with Raﬀ-
man that the important question is the former and everything I say in this paper
can be rephrased using that terminology. For simplicity, I will keep using the more
widespread characterization ‘knowing what it’s like to see red’.
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This was Laurence Nemirow’s original proposal (Nemirow 1980, p.
475), which kicked oﬀ the debate. In a more elaborated version of his
argument, he writes:
Knowing what an experience is like is the same as knowing how to
imagine having the experience (Nemirow 1990, p. 495).
The problem with this proposal is that if I have wild enough imagina-
tion, I can imagine having pretty much any experience, including that
of being a bat. Of course, I may be completely wrong and imagine
experiences incorrectly. But the ability to imagine having experience E
incorrectly is unlikely to constitute the knowledge of what it is like to
have experience E. Knowing what experience E is like, if it is to be
analyzed as having the ability to imagine, seems to imply the ability to
imagine having experience E correctly. Thus, the ability to imagine hav-
ing experience E is not suﬃcient for accounting for knowing what
experience E is like. We need something more.
The most famous and most frequently analyzed version of the Ability
Hypothesis brings in recognitional (and perhaps other) abilities besides
imaginative ones. This is the proposal put forward by David Lewis:
[K]nowing what it is like is the possession of abilities: abilities to
recognize, abilities to imagine, abilities to predict one’s behavior by
imaginative experiments (Lewis 1983, p. 131).
And also:
The Ability Hypothesis says that knowing what an experience is like
just is the possession of these abilities to remember, imagine, and
recognize (Lewis 1990, p. 516).
To sum up:
(AH2) Knowing what it is like to experience E is having the
ability to imagine having experience E as well as having the
ability to recognize having experience E (and perhaps even
remember having experience E).4
4 When analyzing Lewis’ version of the Ability Hypothesis, I will put aside the discus-
sion surrounding the ability to remember (see Mellor 1992 ⁄ 1993) and focus on the
abilities mentioned here: the ability to imagine and to recognize. All the arguments
I give for or against this version in this paper apply (if they do) regardless of
whether we omit the reference to the ability to remember.
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The third version of the Ability Hypothesis can be seen as a compro-
mise between (AH1) and (AH2). The suggestion could be thought of as
a version of (AH1) as it says that knowing what it is like to experience
E is having the ability to imagine having experience E correctly. But
what it means to imagine experiences correctly brings in recognitional
abilities. It could also be thought of as a version of (AH2), because it
gives a speciﬁc proposal for the way in which our imaginative and rec-
ognitional abilities must combine in order for us to know what an
experience is like. D. H. Mellor writes:
To know what experiences of a certain kind are like I must, when I
imagine them, imagine them correctly, i.e. in a way that makes me
recognize them when I have them (Mellor 1992 ⁄ 1993, pp. 4–5).
In other words:
(AH3) Knowing what it is like to experience E is having the
ability to imagine having experience E correctly, that is, in such
a way that would enable one to recognize having experience E.
Before we turn to the objections to these various versions of the Ability
Hypothesis, we need to make yet another distinction between different
interpretations of the Ability Hypothesis. The distinctions I made
above were between versions of the explanans: the question was what
abilities constitute the knowledge of what it is like to experience red.
Now, we need to diﬀerentiate between two diﬀerent possible versions
of the explanandum:
(a) Knowing what it is like to have a speciﬁc token experience e*.
(b) Knowing what it is like to have experiences of type E.
Interestingly, most formulations of the Ability Hypothesis (including all
but one of the quotes I gave in this section) do not make the difference
between (a) and (b) explicit. I assume that the philosophically interesting
question is about the nature of (b) and this paper is supposed to be an
explication of (b). But it is important to distinguish (b) from (a), which
often come up in counterarguments to claims about (b).
(a) is not a very interesting kind of knowledge. If I know what it is
like to have a speciﬁc token experience e*, then it is likely that I am
either having this experience right now, or I have experienced it and I
have a truly excellent episodic memory. But whatever the correct analy-
sis of this kind of knowledge is, what is important for our purposes is
that (a) has little to do with the Knowledge Argument. What Mary was
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supposed to learn when she ﬁrst looked at the red rose was not what it
is like to experience a speciﬁc token experience. She learned what it is
like to experience red. I have very little to say about (a) in this paper.
Some of the criticisms of the Ability Hypothesis apply in the case of all
three proposals, some others only apply to some of them. I will not
rehearse the various objections to the necessity and the sufﬁciency claim
of the three versions of the Ability Hypothesis (see Joyce 2003, Loar 1997,
Conee 1994, Gertler 1999 among others. See also the recent exchange
between Alter 2006 and Jackson 2006. Lycan 1996, chapter 5 and Tye
2004 gave a very good summary of these possible objections and Tye 2004
(section II) as well as Nemirow 2006 give a good overview of why some of
the most frequently cited arguments against the Ability Hypothesis fail).
Instead, I will focus on one speciﬁc objection that applies in the case
of all these three versions and argue that it is not a good argument
against the Ability Hypothesis in general. A new, fourth version of the
Ability Hypothesis can handle this objection and give us a way of sal-
vaging the Ability Hypothesis.
There is a quite simple reason why we would need to be suspicious
about (AH2) and (AH3). Both (AH2) and (AH3) make references to
our recognitional abilities. But some people who became blind late in
their life still claim to know what it is like to experience red and we
have no reason to doubt that they do so. They (at least some of them,
see Aleman et al. 2001, Hollins 1985, Sachs 2003) are capable of visual-
izing red, but they are most certainly incapable of recognizing red,
given that they are blind. They know what it is like to experience red,
but they lack the ability to recognize red. Therefore, (AH2) is wrong.
They also lack the ability to imagine red in such a way that this would
help them to recognize red. Therefore, (AH3) is also wrong.5
Thus, (AH2) and (AH3) need to be discarded: we are back with
(AH1). But we have seen that (AH1) in itself will not do, because it
does not disqualify the ability to imagine having an experience incor-
5 The defenders of (AH2) and (AH3) could argue that although blind people lack the
ability to experience red, they do have the ability to recognize red if they were to
experience it—it’s just that they cannot experience it. The main point is that the
ability to recognize is a conditional ability: an agent has the ability to recognize red
if it is true that were she having the experience of red, she would recognize it. Note,
however, that if we allow for such conditional abilities, then the concept of ability
we end up with will not only be very diﬀerent from our everyday conception (the
ability to travel with the speed of light, of example, would count as an ability we all
have), but it will not be applicable to the original Knowledge Argument case either.
It was true of Mary back in the black and white room that if she had the recogni-
tional and imaginative skills she has now (after her escape), she would be able to
imagine and recognize red. Still, if we described her as already having the ability to
imagine and recognize red back in the black and white room, then it is unclear what
she learnt when she looked at the rose.
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rectly from the imaginative abilities Mary is supposed to acquire. None
of the three versions of the Ability Hypothesis can respond to the
objection just raised.
III. The Ability to Discriminate
We have seen that if we want to identify knowing what it is like to expe-
rience E with having the ability to imagine, we have to specify what it
means to imagine an experience correctly. This is exactly what (AH3)
attempts to do, but as it does so with the help of the notion of recogni-
tional abilities, it is vulnerable to the objection I raised here. If, however,
we ﬁnd a way to specify what it means to imagine an experience cor-
rectly without bringing in recognitional abilities, we could avoid the
same objection. This is precisely what I aim to do in this section.
Instead of bringing in recognitional abilities, I will use a kind of
ability that has not yet been suggested in the Ability Hypothesis litera-
ture: the ability to discriminate.6 My proposal is very simple:
(AH4) Knowing what it is like to experience E is having the
ability to distinguish imagining or having experience E from
imagining or having any other experience.
(AH4) is a disjunctive deﬁnition: the ability to distinguish imagined
experiences (from all other experiences) and the ability to distinguish
real experiences (from all other experiences) are both suﬃcient for
knowing what it is like to experience E.
The imagined experience disjunct of (AH4) could be thought of as
similar to (AH3) in as much as it also cashes out what it is like to
experience E in terms of the ability to imagine having experience E cor-
rectly. Having the ability to imagine having experience E correctly, that
is, in such a way that would enable one to distinguish imagining experi-
ence E from imagining or having any other experience entails knowing
what it is like to experience E. It is different from (AH3), however, in
that it uses the ability to differentiate imagining experience E from
imagining or having other experiences (and not the ability to recognize)
for specifying the ability to imagine correctly.
It is important to emphasize that the ability to distinguish imagined
experiences is a sufﬁcient but not a necessary condition for knowing
what it is like to experience E. After all, there may be some cases where
6 Diana Raﬀman talks about ‘discriminatory’ capacities (Raﬀman 2005), but she
seems to equate these abilities to recognitional ones (see esp. p. 198 and p. 199),
which, as I argued above, are problematic. I will attempt to make a case for the
ability to diﬀerentiate without bringing in recognitional abilities at all.
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an agent does not have the ability to distinguish imagining experiences,
but as she has the ability to distinguish her real experience E from her
other real experiences, she may be described as knowing what it is like
to experience E.
Earl Conee (Conee 1994, p. 138, see also Alter 1998) argued that if a
person lacks the ability to imagine any color experiences, she would
still know what it is like to have an experience of red while looking at
an object that appears red to her.
There may be some empirical problems with this objection: it is far
from clear that such cases exist and that they could even exist.7 Perhaps
perceiving colors presupposes the ability to visualize colors. Peter
Strawson, for example, argued that a necessary feature of perception
is in fact imagination (Strawson 1974, see also Nanay forthcoming).
Further, it has been pointed out that the most frequently quoted empir-
ical cases where agents were capable of perceiving but not visualizing
are not conclusive (Marotta & Behrmann 2004). It is, of course, possi-
ble that an agent can perceive and she also has visual imagery, but she
cannot exercise her visual imagery at will. This example, however,
would not constitute a counterexample to the imagined experience
disjunct of (AH4), as she could still diﬀerentiate (non-voluntarily)
imagining of E from other (also non-voluntary) imaginings.
Because of these considerations, I am not convinced that there are
indeed such agents. But even if there are, this does not pose any prob-
lem for (AH4), since having the ability to distinguish imagined experi-
ences is not necessary for knowing what it is like to have a certain kind
of experience. My claim was that knowing what it is like to experience
E is having the ability to distinguish imagining or having experience E
from imagining or having any other experience. And the person lacking
the ability to imagine (therefore, to distinguish imagining) experiences
can still have the ability to distinguish having experience E from having
any other experience. We have no reason to deny that a person who
does not have the ability to imagine color experiences would also lack
the ability to distinguish two color experiences: just because she cannot
imagine, she could still diﬀerentiate two color samples she is staring at.
Thus, according to our deﬁnition, she could still be described as know-
ing what it is like to experience E.
7 I am not concerned with metaphysical possibility here: I assume throughout the
paper that the Ability Hypothesis is a claim about actual human agents and their
knowledge of what it is like to have certain experiences and not about some meta-
physically possible perceivers and their knowledge. Thus, it would jeopardize
Conee’s objection if it turned out to be the case that no human agent can perceive
without being able to imagine. The metaphysical possibility of such cases (where a
perceiver can perceive without being able to imagine) is irrelevant.
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Conversely, we also need the reference to imagined experiences in
the deﬁnition, otherwise (AH4) would be vulnerable to the objection I
raised in the last section. Blind people, if they are capable of visualiz-
ing, can indeed have the ability to differentiate their imagining red
from their imagining blue. And in this case we would indeed be justi-
ﬁed to say that they know what it is like to experience red.
Thus, we need both disjuncts in (AH4): both the reference to
distinguishing imagining experiences and to distinguishing having
experiences.8
Finally, I need to warn against a possible misunderstanding of the
deﬁnition of (AH4). One may argue that there is a very obvious coun-
terexample to this deﬁnition. Suppose that I am an excellent taste-
distinguisher. I don’t know much about wine, but my taste-buds are so
sensitive that I can differentiate any two tastes. Suppose that I taste a
Sonoma Valley Pinot Noir for the ﬁrst time in my life. I can easily dis-
tinguish it from any other taste as I am such an excellent taste-distin-
guisher. Thus, we have a contradiction. On the one hand, when
presented for the ﬁrst time with a glass of Sonoma Valley Pinot Noir, I
have the ability to distinguish this taste from any other taste. On the
other hand, intuitively we are inclined to say that I do not know what
Sonoma Valley Pinot Noir tastes like.
This objection to (AH4) is important because it draws attention to
a possible type-token ambiguity in the deﬁnition. We have seen that
the explanandum of the Ability Hypothesis is about an experience
type: what we want to understand is what it takes to know what it
is like to have an experience of a certain kind. Thus, ideally, the
explanans also needs to be about an experience type and in (AH4)
the explanans is indeed about experience types – see section VII for
further analysis of the typing of experiences in the explanandum and
the explanans.
Having an experience is always having a token experience, therefore,
distinguishing having experience E from any other experiences is distin-
guishing one token experience from another. But ‘the ability to differ-
entiate having experience E and any other experience’ in my deﬁnition
8 It may be worth noting that the ability to diﬀerentiate (imagined or actual) experi-
ences is also important if we want to make sense of the concept of a ‘quality space’
(Clark 1993, 2000). ‘‘A quality space is an ordering of the qualities presented by a
sensory modality in which relative similarities among those qualities are represented
by their relative distances’’ (Clark 2000, p. 1). Two points in one’s quality space are
distinct if one can distinguish between them. As Austen Clark writes, ‘‘[r]elations of
matching and discriminability are […] used to order the qualities that [the] stimuli
present’’ (Clark 2000, p. 4, see also p. 6). Thus, one’s ability to diﬀerentiate is what
makes one’s quality space the way it is. I need to emphasize though that nothing I
say in this paper relies on Clark’s account of quality space.
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is an ability involving experience types. Thus, the question is how we
get from tokens to types (see Section VII for more details). The short
answer is that ‘the ability to differentiate having experience E and any
other experience’ in my deﬁnition is supposed to be read as having the
ability to distinguish having any token experience of type E from any
token experience that is not of type E.
Thus, the excellent distinguisher of tastes may have the ability to dis-
tinguish the token experience she has from every other experiences (or
even the extremely narrow experience type she has a token of), but she
does not have the ability to differentiate tokens of the experience type
of Sonoma Valley Pinot Noirs from every other experiences. Thus,
according to (AH4), she does not know what Sonoma Valley Pinot
Noir tastes like.
IV. Mislabeling
There is an obvious consequence of (AH4) that one could take to be a
problematic feature of the view. Suppose that I can differentiate
between the (imagined or actual) taste of Sonoma Valley Pinot Noirs
and any other (imagined or actual) taste, including the taste of Central
Coast Californian Pinot Noirs. According to (AH4), this implies that I
know what Sonoma Valley Pinot Noir tastes like. But suppose that
although I am excellent at distinguishing wines, I have never seen or
heard the words Sonoma Valley Pinot Noir: all the numerous bottles
of Sonoma Valley Pinot Noir I have drunk have had their labels miss-
ing. I call the experience of Sonoma Valley Pinot Noir something else,
let’s just say, I call it X. Could we claim that I know what Sonoma
Valley Pinot Noir tastes like? I don’t even know what the expression
‘Sonoma Valley Pinot Noir’ is supposed to stand for, after all.
I think we should indeed claim that I know what Sonoma Valley
Pinot Noir, which I incidentally call X, tastes like. The problem is not
with my knowledge of wine, but with my labeling: I mislabeled Sonoma
Valley Pinot Noir. If I am told that what I have been calling X is in
fact referred to by other people as Sonoma Valley Pinot Noir, this
would not change anything about my knowing what certain type of
wine (that is usually referred to as Sonoma Valley Pinot Noir) tastes
like. It would rather change my way of referring to this type.
To take one of Lewis’s examples, I may be very good at distinguish-
ing the imagined experience of vegemite and marmite. I can also
differentiate imagining either of these from any other taste. But I have
never tasted either vegemite or marmite. When I ﬁnally do taste them,
I realize that although what I imagined to be the taste of vegemite is in
fact the taste of marmite and vice versa. Was I wrong before? In a
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way, I was. I did know what it was like to taste vegemite, but I labeled
it to be marmite. Again, my ability to differentiate imagined experi-
ences was perfect. I just labeled the imagined experiences I was so good
at differentiating incorrectly.9
V. Possible Problems with the Necessity Claim
One could argue that the abilities mentioned in (AH4) are not neces-
sary for knowing what it is like to have experience E. The suggestion is
that (AH4) is too strong: someone can be described as knowing what it
is like to experience E, but she does not have the ability to distinguish
imagining or having E from imagining or having any other experiences.
Michael Tye has the following objection to the Ability Hypothesis
(Tye 2004, section III). Suppose that Mary is looking at a rose. She is
having an experience of the color of the rose, which is a certain speciﬁc
shade of red, say, red17. She lacks the ability to imagine or recognize
the same exact shade, because she cannot tell red17 apart from red19
or red15. Still, as she is gazing at the rose, she certainly knows what it
is like to experience this speciﬁc shade of red. So it is possible to know
what it is like to experience red17 without having the ability to imagine
or recognize having the experience red17. Thus, having the ability to
recognize having experience E is not a necessary condition for knowing
what experience E is like.
Regardless of whether this is a good objection against (AH1), (AH2)
or (AH3), it needs to be examined whether a version of this objection
could pose a problem for (AH4). If Tye is right, then Mary knows
what it is like to experience red17, but perhaps she does not have the
ability to distinguish the (imagined or actual) experience of red17 from
any other (imagined or actual) experience, say, that of red15. How
could we defend (AH4) against this objection?
When Mary is looking at the rose, she certainly has the ability to
differentiate imagining and even having this experience (of the speciﬁc
shade of the rose she is looking at) from imagining or having any other
experience. If we put a color sample of red15 next to the red17 rose,
9 Thus, we may be able to distinguish (actual or imagined) experiences of red but still
mislabel these experiences. A case could be made that the ability to distinguish some
(actual or imagined) experiences (supposedly experiences of red) is, however, a nec-
essary condition for correctly labeling something as red or using the term ‘red’ cor-
rectly. Austen Clark makes a very similar point: ‘‘one needs a shared sense of
qualitative similarity—those capacities of discrimination, matching, and relative sim-
ilarity that order the qualities in a given sensory modality—and presentation of a
suﬃcient number of paradigms and foils (samples within and without the extension
of the term) so that one learns the correct use of the term’’ (Clark 2000, p. 28, see
also Clark 1993).
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she can certainly distinguish these two experiences (see also Nemirow
2006). Thus, at the moment when she is looking at the rose and knows
what it is like to experience the exact shade of color this rose has, she
also has the ability that is supposed to deﬁne knowing what it is like to
experience this shade of red: the ability to distinguish imagining or hav-
ing this experience from imagining or having any other experiences.
A week later, Mary no longer has this ability: she can no longer tell
imagining or having the speciﬁc shade of red17 from the very similar
shades of red15 or red19. But this is exactly what we should expect,
because at this point (a week after having looked at the rose) she does
not know what it is like to experience red17 either.
VI. Possible Problems with the Sufﬁciency Claim
One could also argue that the abilities mentioned in (AH4) are not
sufﬁcient for knowing what it is like to have experience E. A more spe-
ciﬁc worry was raised against (AH1) and (AH2) by Conee (Conee
1994, pp. 138–139, see also Raymont 1999).
Conee gives the following example. Martha is ‘‘highly skilled at visu-
alizing an intermediate shade that she has not experienced between
pairs of shades that she has experienced’’ (Conee 1994, p. 138). Martha
is not familiar with the shade of cherry red. Nevertheless, she has expe-
rienced the shade of ﬁre engine red and she has also experienced the
shade of burgundy. Once Martha is told that cherry red is the interme-
diate shade between burgundy and ﬁre engine red, she can imagine
having the experience of cherry red. She has the ability to imagine
having the experience of cherry red, but she does not know yet what it
is like to experience cherry red. She will know it once she in fact visual-
ized it, but right after she was told that cherry red is the shade between
burgundy and ﬁre engine red, she does not know this yet. Thus, it is
possible to have the ability to imagine cherry red without knowing
what it is like to experience cherry red.
This argument may work in the case of (AH1) (although Noordhof
2003, pp. 24–25 argued otherwise), but it does not work in the case of
(AH4). When Martha is being told about the shade of cherry red, she
may have the ability to imagine this shade (she is ‘‘highly skilled at
visualizing’’, after all), but my claim is that she does not have the abil-
ity to diﬀerentiate imagining or experiencing cherry red from any other
color experiences. Even if she has the ability to imagine cherry red, she
may not be able to diﬀerentiate this imagined experience from the
imagined experience of, say, rubine red. She will acquire the ability to
diﬀerentiate the imagined experience of cherry red from other imagined
experiences, after she imagined experiencing cherry red (and maybe
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compared this imagined experience to other ones), but she does not
have this ability at the moment. Martha has the ability to acquire the
ability to diﬀerentiate cherry red from other shades, but she does not
have this ability just yet.
It is a tricky question whether something is an ability or an ability
to acquire an ability (see Noordhof 2003, pp. 24–25 for a good sum-
mary on this). The following analogy may be helpful.
I don’t speak Swahili. But if I sign up for a Swahili course, I will
acquire the ability to speak Swahili. In this case, there is an activity,
that of taking the language course, that comes before the acquisition of
the ability. Thus, I can be described as having the ability to acquire the
ability to speak Swahili while lacking the ability to speak Swahili.
Paul Raymont argued that in the case of the abilities that are sup-
posed to play a role in the Ability Hypothesis, there is no such time
gap between the activity that makes the ability possible and the ability
itself (Raymont 1999, see also Noordhof 2003, p. 24). More impor-
tantly, when Martha interpolates on the two known experiences of red,
by performing this very act, she imagined the unknown shade of cherry
red. It would be misleading to describe Martha as ﬁrst interpolating
and then after this interpolation has enabled her to acquire the ability
to imagine cherry red, imagining cherry red. She, so Raymont argues,
imagined cherry red by interpolating on the two other colors. Thus we
have no reason to describe these scenarios as ones where one has the
ability to acquire an ability.
Note, however, that while this argument may work in the case of
the ability to imagine (the original case Raymont argues against), as
Martha does have the ability to imagine cherry red in the very moment
when she is told that cherry red is the shade between ﬁre engine red
and burgundy, the abilities (AH4) talks about are different in this very
respect. Martha does not have the ability to differentiate cherry red
from any other experiences at the moment she is told that cherry red is
the intermediate shade between ﬁre engine red and burgundy. She will
need to do a lot of comparing and contrasting before she can be
described as being able to differentiate this so far unknown shade
from every other shades – it takes time to acquire this ability. Thus,
Martha’s case described in the framework of (AH4) is quite similar to
the learning Swahili example.
Thus, when Martha was just told that cherry red is the shade
between burgundy and ﬁre engine red, she does not have the ability
to differentiate imagining or having cherry red experiences from
imagining or having any other experiences. And she does not
yet know what it is like to experience cherry red. There is no
contradiction.
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VII. Yet Another Possible Objection
There is yet another possible objection against the Ability Hypothesis
we would need to consider. I will start with the original versions of the
Ability Hypothesis and then turn to (AH4).
The explanadum of the Ability Hypothesis, as we have seen in sec-
tion II, is about types of experiences. One would expect, then, that
experiences in the explanans are typed in the same way as they are in
the explanadum. But they are not.
It is a controversial question whether we can imagine an experience-
type. One could argue that sensory imagination has a surprising speci-
ﬁcity: we cannot imagine a chair in general, for example. We can only
imagine speciﬁc chairs, albeit with some details not ﬁlled in.10 The same
goes for imagining experiences. One cannot imagine the experience of
wine in general, but only a certain speciﬁc wine-experience. I do not
want to endorse this line of reasoning and rush to the conclusion that
we can only imagine experience tokens. It may be the case that we can
imagine very narrowly individuated experience types (see Martin 2001,
p. 275, Matthen 2005, pp. 319–320). But the problem is that these
experience types we imagine (or we have the ability to imagine) are
individuated diﬀerently from the way experience types are individuated
in the explanadum.
More precisely, the problem is that experience types in the explanans
are more narrowly individuated than experience types in the explanan-
dum. Take the following example. I know what wine tastes like. Thus,
the experience type in the explanadum is a very broadly individuated
experience type: that of wine. But the experience type in the explanans
is much more narrowly individuated: one cannot imagine the taste of
wine in general: one can imagine the taste of a Merlot or a Chablis (or
at least the taste of red wine or white wine), but not the taste of wine
per se. But if experiences in the explanans are more narrowly individu-
ated than experiences in the explanandum, then it is unclear how we are
supposed to get from abilities to imagine certain narrow experience
types to knowing what it is like to have some completely diﬀerent,
much more broadly individuated experience-type.
One option would be to use existential quantiﬁcation: one knows
what it is like to have experience of type E if and only if there is an
experience that is a subcategory of type E, call it E*, such that one has
the ability to imagine E*. In other words, if and only if one has the
ability to imagine a (any) narrower experience type of E.
10 This was already observed by Berkeley (A Treatise Concerning the Principles of
Human Knowledge, Introduction, Paragraph 10) and Hume (A Treatise of Human
Nature, Part I, Section VII).
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This will not give us a satisfactory account of knowing what it is like
to have experiences of type E. Suppose that I have never tasted wine and
I take a sip of Sonoma Valley Pinot Noir (from a speciﬁc year, vineyard,
bottle). I may be very good at imagining speciﬁc tastes so I can imagine
this very ﬁnely individuated experience type ever after. I may also be
able to imagine this experience type in such a way that it would help me
recognize it. Thus, I have the relevant abilities, but what did I learn? Did
I acquire the knowledge of what it is like to taste wine? Or of what it is
like to taste red wine? Pinot Noir? Sonoma Valley Pinot Noir? One
problem is that this account will not be able to discriminate between
these options. Another problem is that none of these options sound too
convincing. As I have never tasted any other wine, in what sense could
we say that I know what Pinot Noirs taste like? It does not sound plausi-
ble to say that it is possible to know what it is like to taste Pinot Noirs
without having any experience or knowledge of the contrast class.
Another option would be to use something like universal quantiﬁca-
tion: one knows what it is like to have experience of type E if and only
if for every (or most) narrower experience type of E, E*, one has the
ability to imagine them.
The strict universal quantiﬁcation will not do as no-one, not even the
very best sommelier, has the ability to imagine every ﬁnely individuated
subcategory of the Pinot Noir experience type. But we encounter similar
problems even if we loosen this criterion and we only require that for
most narrower experience type of E, one has the ability to imagine them.
Our mind is just too limited for making it possible that anyone could
have the ability to imagine most experiences of such a vast experience-
type (which, of course, includes all the terrible home made Pinot Noirs).
But maybe the truth is somewhere in between. Maybe one knows
what it is like to have experience of type E just in case one has the abil-
ity to imagine ⁄ recognize suﬃciently many subcategories of the experi-
ence type E. Not all, not some, but suﬃciently many. Here, the
problem is the following. If I can imagine suﬃciently many experience
types of Pinot Noir, but they all happen to be Sonoma Valley Pinot
Noirs, then in what sense could we say that I know what Pinot Noirs
taste like? I lack the ability to imagine experience types of a Central
Coast Pinot Noir, after all and they are also experiences of Pinot Noir.
If, on the other hand, these ‘suﬃciently many’ Pinot Noir experience
types are somehow evenly distributed across regions (and years as well
as vineyards), then perhaps we can indeed say that I do know what
Pinot Noirs taste like. If we have the ability to imagine ⁄ recognize ‘suﬃ-
ciently many’ subcategories of the experience type E, then, depending
on how they are distributed, sometimes we do know what it is like to
experience E, while some other times, we don’t. This way of connecting
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the more narrowly individuated experiences in the explanans are the
more broadly individuated experiences in the explanandum does not
seem to be a viable option either.
I am not entirely certain that the fact that experiences in the explan-
ans of the Ability Hypothesis are more narrowly individuated than
experiences in the explanandum and that there is no clear way of con-
necting the two would indeed be a knock-down objection against
(AH1), (AH2) and (AH3), but what is important for our purposes is
that (AH4) is certainly not vulnerable to these worries. This will also
help us to clarify a possible type ⁄ token ambiguity in my deﬁnition.
As we have seen, knowing what an experience is like is knowing
what an experience type E is like. Having an experience, on the other
hand, is always having a token experience, therefore, distinguishing
having experience E from any other experiences is distinguishing one
token experience from another. Thus, ‘having the ability to differentiate
having experience E and any other experience’ in my deﬁnition is sup-
posed to be read as having the ability to distinguish having any token
experience of type E from any token experience that is not of type E.
Similar considerations apply in the case of the other disjunct of my
deﬁnition. The experience-types we imagine are more ﬁnely individu-
ated than the experience type we know what it is like to experience.
Thus, ‘having the ability to differentiate imagining experience E and
imagining any other experience’ in my deﬁnition should be read as hav-
ing the ability to differentiate imagining any experience of type E (that
is, any experience type that is a subcategory of E) that one can imagine
and imagining any experience that is not of type E.
Thus, this version of the Ability Hypothesis is not vulnerable to the
possible objection I have been considering here. In general, agent A
knows what it is like to have experience of type E if and only if agent
A has the ability to differentiate imagining or having experiences that
belong to type E from experiences that do not belong to type E. Expe-
riences in the explanans and in the explanandum are typed in the very
same way.
VIII. Conclusion
Let us go back to Mary. What she learns when she looks at the red
rose is what it is like to have the experience of that speciﬁc shade of
red. She does not learn what it is like to see red per se. She will learn
that much later, after having been exposed to more token experiences
of red. But she does learn what it is like to have an experience of a
much more narrow type: experiences of the shade of red that happens
to be the color of the rose. According to (AH4), this means that she
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acquires the ability to diﬀerentiate imagining or having this experience
from imagining or having any other experiences (i.e., the experience of
black or white, the only color-experiences she was familiar with). Thus,
the only thing that changed was that she acquired an ability: the ability
to diﬀerentiate imagining or having an experience of a certain type
from any other experiences.
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